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ARGUMENT 
A WARRANTLESS ENTRY BY AN OFFICER INTO A PRIVATE RESIDENCE IS 
LEGALLY JUSTIFIED WHEN A PUBLIC OFFENSE COMMITTED IN THE 
RESIDENCE IS COMMITTED TtfTHE OFFICER'S PRESENCE. ~~ 
Utah statute allows a peace officer to make an arrest without a warrant("lor any 
public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer." Utah Code 
§77-7-2. The Utah Supreme Court reasoned that "the term public offense, in view of 
other provisions in the statute, necessarily includes every piiblic offense constituting a 
misdemeanor." Oleson v PincocL 251 P 23 (Utah 1926). 
Pursuant to Utah statute or Brigham City Code, the Class B Misdemeanor of 
assault occurs when an individual makes-"an attempt with unlawful force or violence, ten* 
do bodily injury to another; or an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that 
causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another." Utah Code §76-5-102 
and Section 76-5-102, Title 15, Brigham City Code. In this case, the trial court found 
that the peace officer had probable cause to enter the backyard of the residence because 
he observed two juveniles consuming alcoholic beverages. Addendum #1 to Brief of 
Appellant. Then, "upon entering the backyard, the officers observed, through windows 
and a screen door, an altercation taking place wherein it appeared that four adults were 
trying to control a juvenile. At one point, the juvenile got his hand loose and snnkked 
one of the occupants of the residence in the nose" Addendum #1 to Brief of Appellant 
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From the officer's experience and training, he could reasonably deduce that the 
juvenile used unlawful force and violence when he struck one of the adults in the face. 
Additionally, the officer had no doubt that the juvenile's force or violence had caused 
bodily injury to another by bloodying the adult's nose. Therefore, because the officer 
observed every element of the crime of assault being committed in his presence, Utah 
state statute justified his entry into the residence to make an arrest. 
Additionally, pursuant to Utah statute, "An actor commits unlawful detention if 
the actor intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law, and against the will of the 
victim, detains or restrains the victim. . . . " Utah Code §76-5-304. While in the backyard 
the peace officers observed, through window, through windows and a screen door, four 
adults pushing "the teenager up against a refrigerator, holding his arms and yelling at 
him, while the juvenile was struggling wildly to get free and yelling back at the adults." 
See transcript at page 21, line 24 through page 22 line 5. 
The officer had probable cause to believe that all four adults did not have authority 
of law to push the teenager up against the refrigerator while holding his amis and yelling 
at him. Additionally, the officer could also deduce that the juvenile was being detained 
or restrained against his will. Therefore, from the officer's position in the backyard he 
had sufficient probable cause to believe that the Class B Misdemeanor of unlawful 
detention was being committed inside the home. 
Therefore, at least two separate public offenses were committed or attempted in 
the presence of the peace officer. Therefore, pursuant to Utah Code §77-7-2 the officer 
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was legally justified in making an arrest without a warrant. Additionally, this rule, that 
officers may arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors committed in their presence, 
applies to misdemeanors committed within a private residence and yet observable by the 
police officers. 
"A peace officer may, without invitation, enter 'a house or like structure or 
enclosure in private ownership where the circumstances are such as to give him 
knowledge through the report of his senses that a breach of the peace or other 
misdemeanor is being committed or attempted, and there to arrest the offenders for such 
crime.'" State v McGuire, 479 P.2d 187(Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (quoting Adair v Williams. 
210 P 853 (Arizona 1922)). Additionally, "an officer may enter a house or premises 
without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant, or warrant of arrest, where he hears 
or sees a disturbance therein, or where it is detected by his natural senses . . . and as a 
result of such entrance he may make a lawful arrest after entering." Duffy v State, 153 
P.2d 629 (Oklahoma 1944). 
In a recent opinion, the Maryland Court of Appeals quoted the Maryland Supreme 
Court as holding "that it is lawful for a police officer without a warrant to enter and 
search a dwelling when he can see from the outside that a crime is being committed." 
Dunnuck v. State of Maryland. 786 A.2d 695, (Maryland Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Griffin 
v. State. 92 A.2d 743, 745 (1952), cert, denied, 345 U.S. 907, 73 S. Ct. 647, 97 L. Ed. 
1343 (1953)), The Dunnuck Court also noted an additional holding of the Appellate 
Court that ,fa valid visual observation ... furnishes probable cause for... the warrantless 
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entry to effect an arrest for a crime being committed in the officer's presence." Dunnuck 
v. State of Maryland, 786 A.2d 695, (Maryland Ct. App. 2001) (quoting State v. Brown. 
292 A.2d 762, 774 (1972). The Griffin v State court also added that "in deciding whether 
an officer was justified in making an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor, the 
criteria is whether the circumstances presented to the officer through his senses were 
sufficient to justify a sincere belief that the accused was committing the misdemeanor in 
his presence." Griffin v State, 92 A.2d 743. 
For purposes of Utah Code, "presence" of the officer "includes all of the physical 
senses or any devise that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, 
or records the observations of any of the physical senses." Additionally, the Supreme 
Court of Nevada, quoting the Supreme Court of Georgia, stated that "it is a general 
principal that an offense is considered to be committed "in the view" or "in the presence" 
of an officer where any of his senses afford him knowledge that an offense is being 
committed." State v. Smithson, 19 P.2d 631 (Nevada 1933)(quoting Ramsey v State, 17 
S.E. 613, 615)(Sup.Ct. Georgia). "Therefore, an officer on the street, who hears the noise 
of an assault or an affray in a house, is justified in entering and making an arrest for a 
breach of the peace, although all is quiet when he enters the rooms whence the sounds 
preceded." IdL "In such a case the breach of the peace occurs "in the presence" of the 
officer within the meaning of the law." Id 
The officers testified that "from the front of the residence [they] could hear noises 
and loud voices which appeared to indicate, in their training and experience, a physical 
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and oral altercation occurring in the rear of the residence/' Transcript at page 8, lines 19 
through 22 and page 10, lines 3 through 9. Therefore, as a result of these audible 
observations alone, the officers were legally justified in entering the backyard, and would 
have been justified in entering the residence. However, because once in the backyard, the 
public offences in this case were committed in the officer's presence, including both his 
auditory and visual observation of the offense, the great weight of case law and state 
statute demonstrates that the officer was both legally justified and legally obligated to 
enter the residence and put a stop to the affray. 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED WHICH JUSTIFIED THE 
OFFICERS' WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO THE PREMISES. 
A warrantless entry into a private residence is legally justified when there are 
exigent circumstances and when probable cause exists, the "Exigent Circumstances" 
exception. United States v Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir. 1992) "Exigent 
circumstances" are those "that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . 
was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of 
relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly 
frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
In this case, the officer testified that he observed four adults pushing one teenager 
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up against a refrigerator while holding his arms and yelling at him. Transcript at page 
21, line 15-22. At the same time the officers observed the juvenile struggling wildly to 
get free and yelling back at the adults. Transcript at page 21, line 24 through page 22 
line 5. The trial court also foundthat at one point during this violent altercation "the 
juvenile got his hand loose and smacked one of the occupants of the residence in the 
nose." Addendum #1 to Brief of Appellant. The officer then testified that after the 
juvenile struck the adult, the altercation escalated, with more struggling and yelling. 
Transcript at page 43, lines 14 through 25 and page 51, lines 10 through 21. This 
violent altercation, escalating in seriousness and magnitude, clearly fits the definition of 
exigent circumstances in that observing the altercation "would cause a reasonable person 
to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to . . . other persons." 
State v Beavers. 859 P.2d at 18. 
When an appellate court reviews a finding regarding exigent circumstances, its 
task is to review the totality of the facts and circumstances to determine if a finding of 
exigent circumstances was proper. State v Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). 
Additionally, the determination as to whether exigent circumstances existed must be 
based on the officer's reasonable belief. State v Beavers. 859 P.2d at 18. 
Appellees brief attempts to convince the court that the only threat of harm or 
violence in the home was a simple "smack" on the nose. However, a review of the 
totality of the facts shows clearly that the officer personally observed a violent altercation 
between five people in the residence. As four adults were attempting to restrain a 
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juvenile, the juvenile got one hand free and hit one of the four adults in the nose causing 
it to bleed. After such hitting, the struggling and yelling escalated, and the threat of 
additional violence increased. Therefore, the officer could reasonably believe that his 
warrantless entry into the private residence was necessaryio-prevent the physical harm of 
other persons. The officer's reasonable belief, derived from his personal observations of 
the violent altercation, fits squarely within the definition of exigent circumstances and it 
was therefore improper for the trial court to find that no exigent circumstances existed 
which would justify the officer's entry into the residence. 
THE SITUATION PERSONALLY OBSERVED BY THE OFFICER PRIOR TO HIS 
ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE CONSTITUTED EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
AND NOT A MINOR OFFENSE 
Appellees cite Wells v Wisconsin for the proposition that the Class B 
Misdemeanor of assault is a "minor offense" which would not trigger the exigent 
circumstances exception. Wells v Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740 (1984). In Wells v Wisconsin. 
after driving his car erratically, petitioner swerved off the road and came to a stop in a 
field without causing damage to any person or property. IcL at 740. Petitioner then 
walked away from the scene of the accident, ignoring suggestions to the contrary from 
witnesses. LcL When the police arrived, they were told by witnesses that the driver of the 
vehicle was either very drunk or very sick and that he had left the scene. Id "After 
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checking the car's registration, the police, without obtaining a warrant, proceeded to the 
petitioner's nearby home." Id After gaining entry and finding the petitioner lying in bed, 
they arrested petitioner for driving a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant in 
violation of Wisconsin Statute. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court confirmed the Appellate Court's conclusion that 
"The warrantless arrest of petitioner in his home violated the Fourth Amendment because 
the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the 
existence of exigent circumstances." Id At 747. The Supreme Court cites three reasons 
for finding that the facts of this case do not trigger the exigent circumstances exception. 
First, the Court notes that an exception to the warrant requirement is appropriate 
when officers are dealing with "threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or 
security." Id at 751. Second, the Supreme Court reasoned that petitioner wras no longer a 
danger to himself or others. The Court noted that "petitioner had already arrived home, 
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there was little remaining threat to 
the public safety." Id at 753. The third and final reason the Supreme Court found that 
this offense did not rise to the level of exigent circumstances was that "the State of 
Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a non-
criminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible." I d at 754 
(citing Wis. Stat. 346. 65(2)(1975); 346. 65(2)(a)(Supp. 1983 through 1984)). The 
Supreme Court noted the fact that a first offense DUI was classified merely as an 
infraction with no imprisonment possible was the best indication that the offense was 
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minor and did not rise to the level of exigent circumstances. Wells v Wisconsin 466 U.S. 
at 754. 
The facts in the case at hand differ greatly from the facts in Wells v Wisconsin. 
First, unlike the situation in Wells v. Wisconsin, the case at hand involved specific and 
observable threats and crimes of violence. The officer observed a violent altercation 
between five individuals, where one individual was hit in the face. After such hitting, the 
struggling and yelling escalated, and the threat of additional violence increased. Second, 
there was no remaining threat to public safety at the time of the arrest in Wells v 
Wisconsin. In this case, the threats and crimes of violence were occurring in the very 
presence of the officer and continued to occur even after the officer entered the residence. 
Finally, where the offense in Wells v Wisconsin was classified as an infraction with no 
imprisonment possible, the observable misdemeanors in this case were Class B 
Misdemeanors with a maximum possible penalty of $1,850.00 in fines and up to 180 
days imprisonment. 
Therefore, a review of the three important tests for exigent circumstances listed by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Wells v. Wisconsin, clearly demonstrates that exigent 
circumstances existed in this case that justified the officer's warrantless entry. 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has said that warrantless entries into a private 
residence are justified under the exigent circumstance exception to prevent "physical 
harm to the officers or other persons...." State v Beavers 859 P.2d at 13. In the case at 
hand, the officer personally observed serious physical harm being inflicted on a person. 
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Additionally, contrary to Appellees' assertion, after one of the adults was assaulted, the 
violence and tumult continued to escalate. Indeed all of the evidence on the record shows 
that the exigent circumstance tests from both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court were met in the case at hand. There were (1) threats and crimes of 
violence, (2) occurring at the time of the officer's warrantless entry and (3) such crimes 
are serious public offenses. Therefore, because exigent circumstances existed, the officer 
was justified in his warrantless entry into the residence. 
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO JUSTIFY A 
WARRANTLESS ENTRY 
As stated above, probable cause is generally found where there is a "fair 
probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found" State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183, 
1187 (Utah App. 1994). Additionally, Appellees argue that the test for probable cause is 
"that there must be a showing that the officers had the requisite probable cause and could 
have gotten a warrant." See Brief of Appellee, page 11. 
Pursuant to the trial court's findings of fact, "Upon entering the backyard, the 
officers observed through windows and a screen door, an altercation taking place, 
wherein it appeared that four adults were trying to control a juvenile. At one point, the 
juvenile got a hand loose and smacked one of the occupants of the residence in the nose." 
Addendum #1 to Brief of Appellant. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-5-102, an 
assault is "an attempt with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
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an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk 
of bodily injury to another." Therefore, as the officer observed an individual commit 
every element of the crime of assault, there is no question that there is a "fair probability" 
that evidence of such crime would be foundupDn his entry. 
Additionally, pursuant to his personal observation of the violent physical 
altercation occurring in the home, the officer also had probable cause to believe that the 
crime of unlawful detention was occurring in the home. "An actor commits unlawful 
detention if the actor intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law, and against the 
will of the victim, detains or restrains the victim...." Utah Code §76-5-304. After 
witnessing the assault or unlawful detention, it was clear to the officer that the four adults 
were not able to control the situation as the officer observed the violence of the situation 
escalate. 
Therefore, where the officer had probable cause to believe that at least one 
misdemeanor occurred in his presence, he could be sure that he would find evidence of 
such crimes upon his entry into the home. Additionally, There is no question that the 
officer could have acquired a warrant to arrest an individual when he witnessed that 
individual commit an assault, a Class B Misdemeanor, in his presence.1 The officer also 
had sufficient probable cause to believe that additional crimes would be committed in the 
home and in his presence if he did not enter the home and take control of the situation. 
Appellant acknowledges that a warrant would not have been required in this case by Utah Statute, 
Appellant merely seeks here to show that the second prong of the "Exigent Circumstance" exception has been met, 
inasmuch as the officer would have had sufficient evidence to secure a warrant had he attempted to secure one. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the trial courts findings of fact, the trial court committed error in 
finding that the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution precluded the officer's 
warrantless entry into the residence. A warrantless entry by an officer into a private 
residence is legally justified when a public offense committed in the residence is 
committed in the presence of the officer. As discussed above, in this case, public 
offenses were committed in the residence and in the presence of the officer. Additionally, 
a warrantless entry by an officer into a private residence is legally justified when exigent 
circumstances and probable cause exist. Based upon the trial court's findings, both 
exigent circumstances and probable cause existed in this case. Therefore, because both of 
these exceptions to^the warrantless entry requirement exist in this case, the trial court 
should have found that the warrantless entry of the officer into the private residence was 
legally justified. 
Therefore, the trial court's Order granting Defendants' Motion to Suppress should 
be overturned, and Defendants' Motion to Suppress should be denied. 
DATED this /!> day of April, 2002. 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Leonard J. Carson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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